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Ke Shi

Assistant Professor
Finance

Working Papers

  1. The Impact of Privacy Protection on Online Advertising Markets
    EC '23: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023
    Revise and resubmit to The Review of Economic Studies

    Online privacy protection has gained momentum in recent years and has prompted both government regulations and private-sector initiatives. A central element of this movement is the removal of third-party cookies from web browsers, which are widely employed to track online user behavior and implement targeted ads. Using banner ad auction data from Yahoo, we study the effect of a third-party cookie ban on the online advertising market. We first document stylized facts about the value of third-party cookies to advertisers. Adopting a structural approach to recover advertisers' valuations from their bids in these auctions, we simulate a few counterfactual scenarios to quantify the impact of the phase-out of third-party cookies on Chrome, the market-leading browser. The counterfactual analysis suggests that an outright ban would reduce overall publisher revenue by 30% and advertiser surplus by 16%. The introduction of alternative tracking technologies under Google's Privacy Sandbox initiative would partially offset these losses. In either case, we find that big tech firms can leverage their informational advantages over their competitors and gain a larger surplus from the ban.


  2. Self-Control and Commitment in Consumer Credit Markets
    with Yi Xin
    Submitted

    This paper studies whether commitment devices mitigate self-control problems in consumer credit markets. Using data from a major fintech lender, we analyze a refinancing policy that introduced a "direct-pay" option, under which funds are sent directly to creditors rather than borrowers. A difference-in-differences design shows that the policy reduces defaults among eligible borrowers by 11%, while adopters cut default risk by roughly half. We then estimate a structural model of borrowing and repayment behavior. Counterfactuals suggest that self-control frictions account for about 35% of pre-policy defaults. Net of borrower selection and interest-rate incentives, commitment meaningfully improves repayment outcomes.


  3. Mergers and Mismatches in the Labor Market for Creativity

    This paper introduces a novel empirical framework to assess the impact of ownership consolidation on labor markets, addressing growing concerns about labor market power. I develop a two-sided matching model tailored to the creative labor force, a segment characterized by strong worker-firm compatibility. Applying this model to a major merger in the U.S. publishing industry, I leverage rich text data to analyze its effects on the author labor market. Counterfactual merger simulations reveal a trade-off between efficiency gains, creative misalignment, and redistributive effects. While the merger alleviated capacity constraints, post-merger integration resulted in significant creative misalignment between authors and publishers. The merger also triggered substantial value transfers from competing publishers and authors to the merged entity, with established authors bearing the heaviest losses. Notably, the merger's anticompetitive effects manifested primarily in labor markets rather than consumer markets. This research extends merger evaluation beyond consumer impact, providing a framework for analyzing the broader consequences of mergers on labor markets characterized by worker-firm complementarities.


  4. Venture Capital: A Tale of Three Networks

    This paper examines how informal and formal networks shape performance in the venture capital (VC) industry. Using data on all U.S.-based VC investments from 1990 to 2009, supplemented with partner-level educational and employment histories from LinkedIn, I develop a structural framework that connects three types of networks: coinvestment ties, historical affiliations, and latent social connections. In the baseline model, VC performance is a function of peer performance, capturing network spillovers through a micro-founded production function. To address endogeneity in network formation, I extend the model using a two-step instrumental variables strategy that leverages variation in past professional and alumni ties. Finally, I introduce an endogenous network formation model in which VCs strategically choose connections based on expected peer quality, allowing for the recovery of latent social networks from equilibrium outcomes. Across specifications, better-connected VCs exhibit significantly higher exit rates. Estimates from the endogenous model suggest that a 1% increase in social connectedness raises a VC’s exit rate by 0.2 percentage points, while a 1% improvement in peer performance leads to a 0.74 percentage point increase in connection intensity. These findings highlight the economic value of informal relationships and offer new empirical tools for measuring network effects in private capital markets.


  5. Buying Public Offices, Bureaucratic Diversity, and Economic Development

    I show that socioeconomic diversity and business representation in the government could contribute to the development of private enterprises. I study the institution of selling public offices during the late imperial Qing and show that it had a positive impact on early industrialization in China. In traditional Chinese society, merchants had relatively low social status and their businesses were frequently subject to government extortion and appropriation. By taking advantage of the office-selling program, the merchants were able to gain increased representation within the imperial bureaucracy. This, in turn, had a positive spillover effect on the private sector and early industrialization. I argue that changes in bureaucratic composition did not necessarily enhance the institutional environment for businesses. Instead, a more plausible mechanism is that purchasing officials had more progressive ideologies, preferences, and relationships with business interests, ultimately reducing the occurrences of arbitrary government interference and extortion.